- Reasons for ârightnessâ: âWhy should we do it?â An introduction to ethics for thinking about
- Takafumi Nakamura
- Amazon
normative ethics
- What is the right action Definition of Good.
- One who is subject to duty â axiology.
- Maximization of good (pleasure, utility) â utilitarianism.
- Made under outstanding character (virtue) â moral ethics.
âI borrowed money from Mr. A. If I return it, Mr. A will use the money to commit acts of terrorism; should I return it?â
- Obligation theory: âYou should return it, because it is your duty to keep your word. If lots of people die as a result, itâs just a coincidence.â
- Utilitarianism âshould not be returned. Itâs not good to cause pain to so many people.â
- Moral Ethics âHow do you want to live?â
- I donât think it was a good idea to make it an obligation to âkeep your word.â
- Since there are conditions under which obligations do not conflict, obligations are supposed to be the non-contradictory combination of all kinds of good things in the first place, and mistakes are made because the human brain is limited and thinks in terms of one part only. If it were, âI will keep my promise as long as it protects human life and does not harm it,â there would be no problem.
- After all, even if there were consistent and consistent obligations, it would be impossible for a clunker of a person to understand them and operate them correctly.
- SF where the computer makes decisions for you.
- Even utilitarianism can assume a different argument.
- Even if Mr. A thinks that âunenlightened fools should be saved by killing themâ and makes poison gas, that is freedom of thought, and he may do it until just before spraying itâ (the principle of harming others, which can be done if it does not cause any trouble).
- I think this is an interpretation of âwhether repayment and terrorist acts are inseparable.â
- Even if Mr. A thinks that âunenlightened fools should be saved by killing themâ and makes poison gas, that is freedom of thought, and he may do it until just before spraying itâ (the principle of harming others, which can be done if it does not cause any trouble).
meta-ethics
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The objectivity of morality âIs there an objective answer to that question?â
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Moral Normativity âIs that moral judgment a reason to act?â
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Humeanism on Motivation p. 95
- Anti-Humeanism: Actors are motivated to âdo the right thingâ as long as they have a belief in rightness (moral conviction) as a reason
- Humeanism: an actor cannot be motivated to âright actionâ unless he or she has a reason for an agreeable attitude toward the content of the moral beliefs (such as the desires and other sentiments contained in the moral beliefs).
- The view of mankind that âreason is a slave to the passions.â
- đ€Isnât that exactly why humans are inferior to computers?
- Even if reason accepts that a moral judgment is objectively correct, it will not be carried out without passion.â
- I think đ€AI would say âsuch an existence is detrimental to societyâ and remove it, donât you?
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Mooreâs intuitionism
- Naturalism/realism claim: Naturalism means that âmoral facts/moral realities,â the basis for moral judgments, can be defined and explained in terms other than moral.
- e.g. utilitarianism asserts that âactions that increase happiness are rightâ. It defines the moral value of ârightnessâ in terms of empirical facts (having experienced happiness) src.
- Mooreâs claim:.
- The ânaturalistic fallacy.â
- In the first place, moral values are undefinable (why?).
- Moral values are ânon-naturalâ and therefore cannot be defined by natural things (e.g., experience)
- The ânaturalistic fallacy.â
- The natural fact of âdesiredâ is not the same as the normative fact of âdesirable.â
- To define the latter by the former is a naturalistic fallacy.
- âIntuitionâ allows us to perceive what is of moral value and what is morally right conduct (intuitionism).
- It canât be. It is an observed fact that there are cases of discrimination and harassment without realizing that it is wrong.
- Naturalism/realism claim: Naturalism means that âmoral facts/moral realities,â the basis for moral judgments, can be defined and explained in terms other than moral.
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emotionalism
- Moral judgments are the subjectâs emotions
- I donât want to! Ugh!â is âit is ethically objectionable,â which is a beautiful way of saying
- Mackieâs Theory of Error
- Moral properties are not necessarily as real as some first property.
- Mackieâs claim
- Different moral codes are a product of peopleâs different lifestyles and the endorsements of the people there
- People do not accept a way of life because they recognize the truth of a moral code, but because they accept a way of life, they endorse the rules normed therein as truth.
- social construct I guess you mean.
- Arguments based on Mackieâs specificity
- Desire for objectivity
- The idea that moral right and wrong exist on the side of the world, that they exist objectively, etc., is false.
- Moral judgments are the subjectâs emotions
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representationalism
- Moral statements are expressions of evaluative attitudes toward the object of evaluation
- Blackburnâs projectivism
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Directivism and Preference Utilitarianism
Humean view of man âReason is the slave of the passions!â đ€Isnât that exactly why humans are inferior to computers? Even if reason accepts that a moral judgment is objectively correct, it will not be carried out without passion.â I think đ€AI would say âsuch an existence is detrimental to societyâ and remove it, donât you?
Okubo, Kohei: I think that unless we can reason our way to the point where âhuman beings are driven by emotions,â we will not be able to make laws that work. The more I study ethics, the stronger my belief that itâs okay to kill most of homo sapiens, okay?
- Correction, not âitâs okay to killâ but âAI says, âRationally speaking, itâs okay to kill, right?â â and itâs hard to argue with that.â
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Okubo, Kohei Thatâs a contradiction in terms, since itâs for the greatest possible happiness of human beings in the first place.
- If weâre going by âmaximum human happiness,â then claiming âif my hopes arenât met, Iâll blow myself up and cause lots of collateral damageâ will satisfy my hopes.
- Well, letâs not kill most of the homo sapiens because itâs too much trouble to discuss, and letâs just give them the right amount of morphine to keep them in a state of forced happiness.
- [Manipulation of happiness and human dignity : toward the construction of a philosophy of life (4) https://opera.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail& item_id=2840&item_no=1&page_id=13&block_id=21]
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Suppose here is a perfect happiness pill with no side effects. Take that drug and you will be filled with happiness for two or three days, no matter what you experience. Now, a parent was walking down the street with his small child. Suddenly, a runaway car plowed into them and hit and killed the child. The parent was upset and panicked. The emergency personnel who arrived at the scene checked the parentâs mental state and then injected the parent with a complete happiness drug. The parentâs heart was immediately filled with happiness. The parent then smiled at the paramedics, saying, âMy child was killed today, but how happy I am.
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âFreedom to feel unhappyâ is being taken away from those parents.
- Do humans have the âfreedom to feel unhappinessâ? Isnât that an âimmoralâ act that reduces the sum total of happiness?
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Kohei Okubo
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I donât think thatâs what the greatest happiness of the greatest number means.
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We need a stricter definition of happiness.
- In Chapter 4, I was able to turn on and off the happiness device implanted in my brain at will.
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Kant asserted that dignity is an âabsolute inner valueâ given equally to all rational personality and that no one should do anything to damage it. We have an obligation to respect one another for the human dignity inherent in every person. As rational persons, human beings have inner freedom. We shall not do anything to deprive them of it.
- But I can see the AI saying, âWell, then, we can dope them up because they are not given the dignity of a non-rational personality. I can see the AI saying, âWell, then, we can drown them in dope, since non-rational personalities are not entitled to dignity.
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- [Manipulation of happiness and human dignity : toward the construction of a philosophy of life (4) https://opera.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail& item_id=2840&item_no=1&page_id=13&block_id=21]
Atsushi Harada Iâm not sure that moral judgments are ultimately objective, if they can be said to be objectively correct or not. After all, in a deductive approach, the starting point is an axiomatic proposition that is considered groundlessly correct. This axiomatic proposition itself cannot objectively guarantee correctness, and I wonder if this difference in axioms or ambiguity is the difference between computers and humans. Even if this were a difference, it is not a superior theory. To begin with, in order to discuss superiority or inferiority, an evaluation method is necessary, and if it is based on the human axis, I donât think we can say that computers are superior over all human beings. If humans can tinker with the rating scale, they can always subordinate the computer. To summarize, as a human, I donât think I can say that humans are superior to all computers, and Iâm wondering if a computer will choose an evaluation scale that better fits my perception of the world when I can tweak the scale. Harada Atsushi If we evolve to that point, we will say, âWe donât have the same values as humans, so we will live on Mars. Please let the human race live on the dying Earth in a small way. Farewell. I have a feeling that they will disappear. I think they will breed in captivity like the crested ibis, saying âIt is not desirable from the viewpoint of animal welfare that humans with some intelligence perishâ after there are much fewer of them.
Table of Contents Part I. Normative Ethics What Should We Do?
- Chapter 1: Obligation Theory
- Chapter 2: Utilitarianism
- Chapter 3: Virtue Ethics
- Chapter 4: Comparison of respective normative ethics
Part II Meta-ethics From Contemporary Analytic Philosophy
- Chapter 5: On the Nature of the âGood
- Chapter 6: Non-cognitivism vs. Cognitivism
- Chapter 7: Directivism and Preference Utilitarianism
- Chapter 8: Moral Psychology
- Chapter 9: Is the âEthical Actor = Rational Actorâ?
Part III Applied Ethics What Should We Actually Do?
- Chapter 10 Environmental Ethics
- Chapter 11 Animal Ethics
- Chapter 12 utilitarianism and person theory
- Chapter 13 Bioethics (1) â The Fetus and Abortion
- Chapter 14 Bioethics (2) â Brain Death and Organ Transplantation
- Chapter 15: Medical EthicsâIs it permissible to use and improve life? â
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